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Abstract
It is natural in a quantum network system that multiple users intend to send their quantum message to their
respective receivers, which is called a multiple unicast quantum network. We propose a canonical method to derive
a secure quantum network code over a multiple unicast quantum network from a secure classical network code. Our
code correctly transmits quantum states when there is no attack. It also guarantees the secrecy of the transmitted
quantum state even with the existence of an attack when the attack satisfies a certain natural condition. In our security
proof, the eavesdropper is allowed to modify wiretapped information dependently on the previously wiretapped
messages. Our protocol guarantees the secrecy by utilizing one-way classical information transmission (public
communication) in the same direction as the quantum network although the verification of quantum information
transmission requires two-way classical communication. Our secure network code can be applied to several networks
including the butterfly network.
Index Terms
secrecy, quantum state, network coding, multiple unicast, general network, one-way public communication
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to realize quantum information processing protocols to overwhelm the conventional information
technologies among multiple users, it is needed to build up a quantum network system among multiple users. For
example, various quantum protocols, e.g., quantum blind computation [2], [3], quantum public key cryptography [1],
and quantum money [4] require the transmission of quantum states. To meet the demand, the paper [5] initiated the
study of quantum network coding with the butterfly network as a typical example. Under this example, the paper [6]
clarified the importance of prior entanglement in a quantum network code by proposing a network code, which was
experimentally implemented recently[7]. Kobayashi et al. [8] discussed a method for generating GHZ-type states
via quantum network coding. Leung et al. [9] investigated several types of networks when classical communication
is allowed. Based on these studies, Kobayashi et al. [10] made a code to transmit quantum states based on a linear
classical network code. Then, Kobayashi et al. [11] generalized the result to the case with non-linear network codes.
These studies [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] clarified that quantum network coding is needed among multiple users for
efficient transmission of the quantum states over a quantum network. However, these existing studies did not discuss
the security for quantum network codes when an adversary attacks the quantum network.
Since the improvement of the security is one of the most essential requirements for developing quantum networks,
the security analysis is strongly required for quantum network codes. Indeed, it is possible to check the security
in these existing methods by verifying the non-existence of the eavesdropper. However, the verification requires us
to repeat the same quantum state transmission several times as well as two-way classical communication. Hence,
it is impossible to guarantee the security under a single transmission in the simple application of these existing
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2methods. Therefore, it is needed to propose a quantum network code that guarantees its security. That is, our aim
is a natural extension of classical secure network coding.
On the other hand, for a classical network, Ahlswede et al.[13] started the study of network coding. Then, Cai
et al. [14] initiated to address the security of network code, and pointed out that the network coding enhances the
security. Currently, many papers [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27] have already
studied the security for network codes. In these studies, the security was shown against wiretapping on a part of
the channels. Hence, it is strongly needed to propose a quantum network code whose security is guaranteed under
a similar setting. In the previous paper [28], we initiated a study of the security of quantum network codes, and
constructed a quantum network code on the butterfly network which is secure against any eavesdropper’s attack on
any one of quantum channels on the network. In fact, after the conference version [29] of this paper, several studies
[30], [31], [32] investigated the security for the quantum network code when an adversary attacks the quantum
network. However, they did not discuss a method for converting an existing classical network code to a quantum
network code. Our method can be universally applied to any classical network code as follows.
To see our contribution, we explain the characteristics of a quantum network. Studies on classical network coding
have most often discussed the unicast setting, in which, we discuss the one-to-one communication via the network.
Even in the unicast setting, there are many examples of network codes that overcome the routing, as numerically
reported in [33, Section III]. However, in the quantum setting, it is not easy to find such an example in the unicast
setting. As another formulation, studies on classical network coding often focus on the multicast setting, in which one
sender sends information to multiple receivers. However, no-cloning theorem prohibits a straightforward extension
of classical multicast network coding to quantum multicast network coding, even though there exists various types
of quantum multicast communication protocols utilizing classical multicast network codes [8], [34], [35], [36].
Hence, we discuss the multiple-unicast setting, which has multiple pairs composing of senders and receivers, since
we can construct a problem setting of quantum multiple-unicast network coding as a straightforward extension of
the problem setting of classical multiple-unicast network coding. In addition, the multiple-unicast setting has not
been well examined even in the classical case, i.e., it has been discussed only in a few papers such as Agarwal et
al. [37] with the classical case.
In this paper, we generally construct a quantum linear network code in the multiple-unicast setting whose security
is guaranteed. Our code is canonically constructed from a classical linear network code in the multiple-unicast
setting, and it certainly transmits quantum states when there is no attack. Our main issue is the secrecy of the
transmitted quantum states when Eve attacks only edges in the subset EA of the set of edges of the given network.
That is, we show the secrecy of our quantum network code when the secrecy and recoverability of the corresponding
classical network are shown against Eve’s attack on the subset EA of edges. That is, we clarify the relation between
quantum secrecy and the pair of classical secrecy and classical recoverability in the network coding. We also give
several examples of such secure quantum network codes. Indeed, it is not so easy to satisfy this condition for
the corresponding classical network. Hence, we allow several nodes in the network to share common randomness,
which is called shared randomness, and assume that Eve priorly does not have any information about this shared
randomness. Since a quantum channel is much more expensive than a classical public channel, we assume that
the classical one-way public channel can be freely and unlimitedly used from each node only to terminal nodes
which are in the directions of the subsequent quantum communications. Under this assumption, the transmission
of a quantum state from a source node to the corresponding terminal node is equivalent to sharing a maximally
entangled state via quantum teleportation [38]. Hence, we show the reliability of the transmission by proving that an
entangled state can be shared by sending entanglement halves from source nodes. Our general construction covers
the previous code for the butterfly network in [28].
Here, we emphasize the difference between our offered security from the conventional quantum security like
quantum key distribution (QKD), which essentially verifies the noiseless quantum communication. In QKD, for
this verification, we need two-way classical communication, which enables us to verify the non-existence of the
eavesdropper and to ensure the security. However, our analysis can guarantee the security only with one-way
classical communication because we assume that the eavesdropper wiretaps only a part of the channels. Also, the
verification in QKD can be done under an asymptotic setting with repetitive use of quantum communications. In
contract, our security analysis holds even with the single-shot setting without such repetitive use.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II prepares several pieces of knowledges for
secure classical network coding including secrecy and recoverability. Section III provides our general construction
3of secure quantum network coding and shows the secrecy theorem. Section IV discusses several additional examples
of secure quantum network coding. Appendix A gives several lemmas used in these examples. Appendix B gives
the precise constructions of the matrices appearing in the main body.
II. PREPARATION FROM SECURE CLASSICAL NETWORK CODING
In this section, we introduce classical network coding and its secrecy and recoverability analysis which is
necessary for analyzing the security of the derived quantum network codes in the next section.
A. Classical linear multiple-unicast network coding
The quantum multiple-unicast network codes can be derived from any classical linear multiple-unicast network
codes with shared-secret randomness, where the linearity condition is imposed for the operations on all the nodes.
In the classical setting of the network coding, the network is expressed by a directed graph (V˜ , E˜). The set of
vertices V˜ indicates the set of nodes which are the senders and receivers of communications. The set of edges E˜
indicates the set of the communication channels, i.e., the set of packets. When a single character in Fq is transmitted
from a vertex u ∈ V˜ to another vertex v ∈ V˜ via a channel in the classical network code, the channel is indicated
by (u, v) ∈ E˜ in the directed graph. Note that Fq is the finite field whose order q is a prime power.
The purpose of the multiple-unicast network coding is that the nodes cooperatively transmit the n messages from
a part of the nodes (called source nodes) to other part of nodes (called terminal nodes). For individual message,
the pair of the source node and the terminal node are predefined. A single source or terminal node may appear
multiple times in the set of the pairs. In other words, a source node may be required to send messages to plural
terminal nodes, and plural source nodes may be required to send messages to an identical terminal node. As you
can find, our setting includes the unicast setting as well. In our classical network code setting, we consider the
situation that part of communications are eavesdropped by Eve. In order to make the code secure, i.e. to prevent
the leakage of information correlated to the messages, n′ shared-secret randomnesses are used. The nodes which
use any of the randomnesses are called shared-randomness nodes. To make the following discussion clearer, we
denote the sets of source nodes, terminal nodes, and shared-randomness nodes by VS , VT , and VSR.
In fact, the notation defined above is not enough to analyze the network code systematically, especially in the
case of the derived quantum network code. Therefore, we will extend the structure of the network.
1) Definition of sets which characterize the extended network: As an extension of the network, we virtually
introduce additional input vertices, output vertices, and shared-randomness vertices, such that there is one-to-one
correspondence between the j-th message and the pair of the input vertex ij and the output vertex oj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
and there is one-to-one correspondence between the j-th shared-secret randomness and the shared-randomness vertex
rj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′. In the following, we denote the sets of input vertices, output vertices, and shared-randomness
vertices by VI = {i1, · · · , in}, VO = {o1, · · · , on}, and VR = {r1, · · · , rn′}, respectively. Now, we give the set of
vertices for the extended network as V := V˜ ∪ VI ∪ VO ∪ VR, where these sets have no intersection.
Next, we virtually add input edges, output edges, and shared-randomness edges which connect between virtual
vertices and the nodes in V˜ so as to satisfy the following conditions: Any input vertex is connected only by an input
edge to the source node which possesses the corresponding message initially in the classical network code. Any
output vertex is connected only by an output edge from the terminal node which receives the corresponding message
finally in the network code. And, any shared-randomness vertex rj is connected only by lj shared-randomnesses
edges to all the shared-randomness nodes where the corresponding shared-secret randomness is distributed initially
in the network code. From now on, we denote the sets of input edges, output edges, and shared-randomness
edges by EI , EO, and ER, respectively. From these definitions, we know that |EI | = |EO| = n and the number
|ER| of shared-randomness edges is l :=
∑n′
j=1 lj . Now, we give the set of edges for the extended network as
E := E˜ ∪EI ∪EO ∪ER. Note that, these sets have no intersection, so, |E| = N +2n+ l where N is the number
of edges |E˜| for the original network. In the following, we doesn’t distinguish the edges and the corresponding
4communication channels. To clarify what we have defined, we show typical relations for the set defined above:
VS = {v ∈ V |∃u ∈ VI s.t. (u, v) ∈ E} ,
VSR = {v ∈ V |∃u ∈ VR s.t. (u, v) ∈ E} ,
VT = {u ∈ V |∃v ∈ VO s.t. (u, v) ∈ E} ,
EI = {(u, v) ∈ E|u ∈ VI , v ∈ V } ,
EO = {(u, v) ∈ E|u ∈ V, v ∈ VO} ,
ER = {(u, v) ∈ E|u ∈ VR, v ∈ V } . (1)
Some numbers defined above are summarized in Table I for convenience.
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF THE NETWORK CODING. NOTATIONS UNDEFINED HERE WILL BE DEFINED LATER.
n
No. of input edges. |EI |
No. of output edges. |EO |
No. of input vertices. |VI |
No. of output vertices. |VO |
l No. of shared-randomness edges. |ER|
n′ No. of shared-randomness. |VR|
N No. of edges in the original network. |E˜|
h No. of edges attacked by Eve. |EA|
h′ No. of protected edges. |EP |
2) Definition of maps which characterize the network code: To identify the ordering of the channels, we define
a map e from {1, · · · , N + 2n + l} to E as follows. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, e (j) is an input edge going out from an
input vertex ij . For 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′, e
(
n+ 1 +
∑j−1
k=1 lk
)
, · · · , e
(
n+
∑j
k=1 lk
)
are sheared-randomness edges going
out from a sheared-randomness vertex rj . e (n+ l + 1) , · · · , e (N + n+ l) are edges in the directed graph (V˜ , E˜)
which is originally defined in the classical network coding. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, e (N + n+ l + j) is an output edge
going into an output vertex oj . We consider that, if j < k, the channel e(j) is used before the channel e(k) is
used, and we regard j as the time t when the channel e(j) is used.
For an edge e ∈ E, we denote its input and output vertices by vI (e) and vO (e). The definition means that
the relation e = (vI (e) ,vO (e)) holds. Note that: though we use the same character e for both a “edge” variable
in E and a function defined in the previous paragraph, we don’t mention about it below if it is easy to identify
which it means. Next, we define a map from integers j to the set of natural numbers identifying the edges that
have transmitted their contents to the vertex vI (e (j)) before the time t = j:
I (j) := {k ∈ N|k < j, ∃v ∈ V, s.t. e (k) = (v,vI (e (j)))} , (2)
which enables us to make expressions simple.
We consider that, at the j-th channel, a random variable Yj is imputed as a transferred content in the network.
Therefore, at the time t = j, Yj is generated at the node vI (e (j)), and, transmitted it via the channel e (j).
Immediately after the time, the value is received by the vertex vO (e (j)) if there is no disturbance. In fact, we will
consider the case that Eve may disturb the contents of part of channels later. Note that, in the case of 1 ≤ j ≤ n
or N + n + l < j ≤ N + 2n + l, we consider that the j-th channel virtually transfers a message which is
initially occupied at the corresponding source node or is finally reconstructed at the corresponding terminal node
respectively. Furthermore, in the case of n < j ≤ n + l, we consider that the j-th channel virtually transfers a
sheared-secure randomness which is sheared at the corresponding sheared-randomness nodes. This interpretation
indicates that {Yj}j∈{1,··· ,n} are the messages, and {Yj}j∈{n+1,··· ,n+l} are the sheared-secret randomnesses,
In order to fix the classical linear network codes, the rest of work we have to do is to give the way to generate
the random variables Yj which is transferred by the j-th channel e (j) for n + l < j ≤ N + 2n + l. Recall that
we impose the linearity condition on the operations on all the nodes, and, only the random variables {Yk}k∈I(j)
can be used for generating Yj at the vertex vI(e (j)). Therefore, Yj can be evaluated as a linear combination
5∑
k∈I(j) θj,kYk for appropriate constants θj,k ∈ Fq. We can easily check that the set {θj,k}j∈{n+l+1,...,|E|},k∈I(j)
completely identifies the linear multiple-unicast coding on the given network. For convenience, we define θj,k = 0
for k * I (j) so that we have
Yj =
∑
k∈I(j)
θj,kYk =
∑
k<j
θj,kYk. (3)
for n+ l+ 1 ≤ j ≤ N + 2n+ l. Note that, the above relation doesn’t hold if there is disturbance on the channels,
e.g. attacks by Eve, because, in that case, no one guarantee that the received content from the edge e(j) is equal
to the sent content into the the edge e(j), i.e. Y (j).
Fig. 1. Example of a vertex and connecting edges
Example 1. As an example, a local structure for a network defined above is depicted in the Figure 1, i.e. a vertex
and connecting edges. The edges e (2), e (5), and e (7) go into the vertex and the edges e (4) and e (8) go out
from the vertex. Both vI (e (4)) and vI (e (8)) indicate the vertex. At the time t = 4, the content from e (2) has
arrived, but the contents from e (5) and e (7) have not yet. Since e (1) and e (3), which do not appear in Figure 1,
do not connect to vI (e (4)), the operation on vI (e (4)) is determined by θ4,2 only, and {θ4,j}j<4 can be written
as
{θ4,j}j<4 := (0, θ4,2, 0) .
Similarly, at the time t = 8, all the contents from e (2), e (5), and e (7) have been received at vI (e (8)). Thus,
the content sent by e (8) can be written as
∑
j<8 θ8,jYj , where Yj is content received from e (j), and {θ8,j}j<8 =
(0, θ8,2, 0, 0, θ8,5, 0, θ8,7).
Due to the linear structure given in (3), the random variables Yj is given as a linear combination of the messages
~A := (A1, · · · , An) given in the input vertices and the shared-secure-random variables ~B := (B1, · · · , Bn′)
generated at the shared-randomness vertices virtually. For simplicity, combining these random variables, we define
the random vector ~X ′ := ( ~A, ~B) = (X ′1, · · · ,X
′
n+n′). From the constants {θj,k}j∈{1+n+l,...,|E|},k∈I(j), we can
uniquely construct an Fq-valued (N + 2n + l)× (n+ n′) matrix M0 whose (j, k) element is m0 (j, k) such that
Yj =
n+n′∑
k=1
m0 (j, k)X
′
k, (4)
if there is no disturbance. The concrete construction of M0 is given in Appendix B-A. Since e (j) is an output
edge for N + n+ l + 1 ≤ j ≤ N + 2n+ l, the corresponding elements m0 (j, k) must satisfy{
m0
(
N + n+ l + j′, k′
)}n+n′
k′=1
= (~0j′−1, 1,~0n+n′−j′) (5)
6for 1 ≤ j′ ≤ n. Note that we use the notation ~0j := (
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0). Rigorously writing, we can define a multiple-unicast
network code by the following condition:
Definition 1. Let (E,V ) be a directed network with ordered edges, n and l be constants which satisfies 2n+l ≤ |E|,
and I(j) be a map defined by Eq. (2). A network code {θj,k}j∈{1+n+l,...,|E|},k∈I(j) is called a multiple-unicast
network code if the coefficients {m0 (j, k)}j,k satisfy Eq.(5), where the coefficients {m0 (j, k)}j,k are defined by
Eq. (4).
B. Secrecy of classical multiple-unicast network code
In this subsection, we analyze the secrecy of the classical network code. The analysis is necessary to derive the
main results regarding quantum network codes. Although there are a lot of existing works on secrecy of classical
network coding [14], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], they don’t discuss the case
when an adversary called “Eve” disturbs the contents on the part of channels as well as she wiretaps the part of
channels. Only the paper [39] discusses such an adversary, though its analysis is limited to the unicast case.
1) Definitions related to Eve’s attack: We define EA ⊂ E˜ as the set of edges attacked by Eve, and h is the size of
the set, i.e., h := |EA|, respectively. Note that, since all the edges in the set E\E˜ are virtual ones, Eve can’t access
the edges. Eve is assumed to be able to eavesdrop and disturb the contents on all the channels in EA. Eve also knows
the network structure, i.e., the topology of network and all the coefficients {θj,k}j,k. In order to make expressions
simply, we define a strictly increasing function ς (j) ∈ N so that EA can be written as EA = {e (ς (j))}
h
j=1. That is,
the target of the j-th Eve’s attack is the edge e (ς (j)). In order to analyze such a situation, we introduce other random
variables: the wiretapped random variable Zj := Yς(j) from the communication identified by the edge e (ς (j)),
and the injected random variable Cj to the vertex vO (e (ς (j))) instead of Zj . In order to simplify the following
discussion, we define two random variable vectors: ~C := (C1, . . . , Ch) and ~X := ( ~A, ~B, ~C) = (X1, · · · ,Xn+n′+h).
Due to the linear structure of the network, there uniquely exists an Fq-valued (N + 2n+ l)× (n+ n′ + h) matrix
M whose (j, k) element is m (j, k) satisfying that the input information Yj of the edge e(j) can be expressed by
Yj =
n+n′+h∑
k=1
m (j, k)Xk, (6)
when the contents on the edges EA are disturbed by Eve. The concrete construction of M is given in Appendix
B-B.
When we name the received content from the edge e(j) as Y ′j , the random variable can be defined as
Y ′j :=
{
Ck when there exists j satisfying j = ς (k)
Yj otherwise.
(7)
We can easily define the Fq-valued (N + 2n+ l)× (n+ n′ + h) matrix M ′ which gives Y ′j from ~X as
Y ′j =
n+n′+h∑
k=1
m′ (j, k)Xk, (8)
where m′ (j, k) is a (j, k) elements of the matrix M ′. That is
m′ (j, k) :=
{
δk,n+n′+j′ when there exists j
′ satisfying j = ς (j′)
m (j, k) otherwise.
(9)
From now on, we fix the set of edges where Eve attacks, i.e. EA, and the network code, i.e. {θj,k}j,k. That
means, the matrices M0, M , M
′, and the maps ς , e, vI , vO are fixed.
72) Categorization of Eve’s attack: In order to reduce complicate Eve’s attack into simple one, we categorize
her attack into three types: simple attack, deterministic attack and probabilistic attack:
Simple attack: A simple attack is an attack in which Eve just deterministically chooses her injecting value ~C =
{Xn+n′+j}
h
j=1 as a constant. Therefore, the injected value is independent from the wiretapped values {Zj}
h
j=1.
Deterministic attack: A deterministic attack is defined by a set of functions {gj}
h
j=1:
gj : F
j−1
q → Fq,
where gj is not restricted to a linear function. The function gj gives Eve’s j-th injected value Cj = Xn+n′+j
generated from the wiretapped variables {Zk}
j−1
k=1 in her hand as
Cj = gj
(
{Zk}
j−1
k=1
)
= gj

{n+n′+h∑
k′=1
m
(
ς (k) , k′
)
Xk′
}j−1
k=1

 .
This attack is a special case of the causal strategy defined in the paper [39]. We write the set of all deterministic
attacks as G, i.e. all the set of {gj}
h
j=1. Note that a simple attack is also a deterministic attack.
Probabilistic attack: A probabilistic attack is an attack in which Eve probabilistically chooses one of the
deterministic attacks {gj}
h
j=1 and applies it. Hence, a probabilistic attack is determined by a probability distribution
PG
(
{gj}
h
j=1
)
on the set of all deterministic attacks G, where G is the corresponding random variable. Note that a
deterministic attack {gj}
h
j=1 is a special probabilistic attack whose probability distribution satisfies PG
(
{gj}
h
j=1
)
=
1 and PG
({
g′j
}h
j=1
)
= 0 for any other deterministic attack
{
g′j
}h
j=1
.
Note that, even in the case of probabilistic attack, the set of edges where Eve attacks, i.e. EA, is fixed.
3) Reduction of complex Eve’s attacks into simple ones: First, we consider the deterministic attack. In this case,
any attack can be reduced to a simple attack with ~C = ~0 = (0, 0, · · · ), i.e. for any deterministic attack, there is a
simple attack with ~C = ~0 where Eve can get the same information with both strategies. The reason is as follows.
For the original deterministic attack {gj}
h
j=1, Eve’s information is given as {Zj}
h
j=1. In the case of the simple
attack, i.e. ~C = ~0, we denote Eve’s information by
{
Z˜j
}h
j=1
. Due to the linearity of the network, we have
Zj = Z˜j +
h∑
k=1
m(ς (j) , n+ n′ + k)gk({Zk′}
k−1
k′=1), (10)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ h. As you can check, all the elements m(j, k) are defined by the network code and the set of edges
where Eve attacks. This fact guarantees that we can solve the eq. (10) with respect to {Zk}
j
k=1. This fact can be
rewritten as the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ([39, Theorem 1]). Any deterministic attack can be reduced to a simple attack with ~C = ~0h. Since any
probabilistic attack is given as a probabilistic mixture of deterministic attacks, it can also be reduced to the simple
attack with ~C = ~0h.
For reader’s convenience, we summarize all the random variables we defined in Table II
TABLE II
RANDOM VARIABLES OF THE NETWORK CODING.
Aj The random variable of the j-th message
Bj The random variable of the j-th shared number
Cj The random variable injected at the end of edge e(ς (j))
Xj An alias of the variable Aj , Bj−n, or Cj−n−n′
Yj The random variable inputted to the edge e(j)
Y ′j The random variable outputted from the edge e(j)
Zj The random variable wiretapped at the edge e(ς (j))
Z˜j The random variable wiretapped at the edge e(ς (j)) under the virtual condition ~C = ~0h
84) Security analysis for Eve’s attack on EA: For given EA and the function ς , we define a h × (n+ n
′ + h)
matrix Mς whose elements are given by {m (ς (j) , k)}1≤j≤h,1≤k≤n+n′+h. We further define submatrices of Mς as
Mς = (Mς,1,Mς,2,Mς,3) where the sizes of Mς,1, Mς,2, and Mς,3 are h× n, h× n
′, and h× h, respectively. For
~x =
(
~a,~b,~c
)
∈ Fn+n
′+h
q , the condition
zj =
n+n′+h∑
k=1
mς (j, k) xk (11)
can be rewritten as
~z = Mς,1~a+Mς,2~b+Mς,3~c. (12)
Lemma 2. Secrecy holds for Eve’s attack on EA if and only if the following condition holds: For any vector
~a ∈ Fnq , there exists a function ~b(~a) ∈ F
n′
q such that
Mς,1~a = Mς,2~b(~a). (13)
The condition is trivially equivalent to the condition that the image of Mς,1 is contained in that of Mς,2.
Proof: Due to Lemma 1, it is enough to discuss the case with ~C = ~0. When secrecy holds, {Mς,2~b|~b ∈ Fn
′
q } =
{Mς,1~a+Mς,2~b|~b ∈ Fn
′
q } for any ~a ∈ F
n
q . The latter set contains Mς,1~a, which ensures the existence of
~b(~a). When
such a function ~b(~a) exists, the distribution of Mς,2 ~B is the same as that of Mς,1~a+Mς,2 ~B. That is because the
variable ~B is uniformly distributed. This fact implies the secrecy.
C. Recoverability against Eve’s attack
For our analysis of deriving quantum network coding, we need to introduce the concept of recoverability of
the classical network code against Eve’s attack in addition to the secrecy. The concept of recoverability is defined
as follows. We consider the situation that Eve can disturb contents on the channels in EA as is done in the case
of secrecy analysis. In other words, she can inject any contents on the channels in EA. In such a situation, we
imagine a receiver Bob who can use all the received contents of the the channel identified by a set EP ⊂ E\ER.
For convenience, we give a name “protected edges” to the edges in EP . He can additionally access all the shared-
random variables, and can know the set EA and the network structure, i.e. the matrix M
′. However, Bob does not
know what content is injected in the channel in the set EA, if the channel is not in the set EP . In this case, if Bob
can reconstruct the original messages, we call that the messages is recoverable from Eve’s attack by the protected
edges EP . We will require the recoverability by a certain subset EP for the security of a deriving quantum network
code.
TABLE III
SETS OF EDGES OF THE NETWORK CODING.
E˜ The set of edges which express actual channels
EI The set of input edges connected from input vertices
EO The set of output edges connected to output vertices
ER The set of shared-randomness edges connected from shared-randomness vertices
E The union of the sets E˜, EI , EO, and ER
EP The set of protected edges
EA The set of edges attacked by Eve
Now, we give more rigid definition of the concept of the recoverability. For the subset EP , we define the
strictly increasing function ι : {1, · · · , |EP |} → {1, · · · , n, n+ l + 1, · · · , N + 2n+ l} which satisfies EP =
{e (ι (j))}h
′
j=1, where h
′ := |EP |. Then, the contents
{
Y ′ι(j)
}h′
j=1
received from the protected edges EP can be
written as
Y ′ι(j) =
n+n′+h∑
k=1
m′ι (j, k)Xk, (14)
9where m′ι (j, k) := m
′ (ι (j) , k) is a matrix elements of the h′ × (n+ n′ + h) matrix M ′ι . Then, we rigidly define
the concept of the recoverability as follows.
Definition 2. We call that the messages are recoverable for Eve’s attack on EA by a subset EP , when for any
vector ~b ∈ Fn
′
q , there exists a function f~b : F
h′
q → F
n
q such that
f~b
(
M ′ι · (~a,~b,~c)
T
)
= ~a (15)
for any ~a ∈ Fnq and ~c ∈ F
h
q .
Here, T means the transposition. Note that the matrix M ′ι is uniquely given only from the matrix M0 and the
sets EA and EP .
The function f~b is nothing but a decoder of the messages
~A from the contents received from EP . The function
depends on M ′ι and
~b only. Since condition (15) does not depend on the choice of ~c, it guarantees the recoverability
even when Eve chooses ~C depending on her wiretapped variable.
Notice that this kind of recoverability does not imply the recoverability of the messages by terminal nodes, and
we don’t assume the condition EP ∩EA = ∅. In other words, a channel corresponding to a “protected” edge may
be disturbed by Eve. Therefore, at the channel in EP ∩ EA, Eve can completely control the information obtained
by Bob.
It is informative to show a toy example of a classical network code in which the contents from the edges in
EP ∩EA are useful to recover the messages. The example is as follows. A single message A1 is transfer from s1 to
t1 via two channels e(2) and e(3) simultaneously. There is no randomness. The terminal node t1 sums up the two
received contents and obtains recovered message by dividing it by 2. e(1) and e(4) are the input edge and output
edge respectively. We define the set EP to be {e(3), e(4)}, and consider the case EA = {e(3)}. In this case, we
can give
M ′ι =
(
0 1
2−1 2−1
)
, (16)
and we know that ~A ∈ F1q and ~C ∈ F
1
q . Therefore, by selecting the function f~b(~y) as 2y2 − y1, we can check that
the message is recoverable for Eve’s attack on EA = {e(3)}, though this network code isn’t secure against Eve’s
attack on EA. The necessity of the content from the channel e(3) ∈ EP ∩ EA is checked from the fact that the
coefficient of y1 for the function f~b(~y) is not 0.
In the end of this section, the defined matrices in this section are summarized in Table IV.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF MATRICES
matrix input system output system equation
M0 messages, shared random variables
inputs of all edges
(4)
= outputs of all edges
M
messages, shared random variables,
inputs of all edges (6)
Eve’s input
M ′
messages, shared random variables,
outputs of all edges (9)
Eve’s input
Mς
messages, shared random variables,
inputs of attacked edges (11)
Eve’s input
M ′ι
messages, shared random variables,
outputs of protected edges (14)
Eve’s input
III. SECURE QUANTUM NETWORK CODING FOR GENERAL NETWORK
A. Coding scheme
In this section, we derive a quantum network code from a linear classical network code, and analyze the security
of the quantum network coding based on the properties of the original classical network coding which are discussed
in the previous section. Quantum network coding can be categorized by the type of classical communication allowed
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[5], [6], [8], [9], [10], [11]. In this paper, we consider the case that any authenticated public classical communication
from any nodes to the terminal nodes is freely available, and all the communication may be eavesdropped by Eve.
In this case, it is known that, for an arbitrary classical multiple-unicast code on an arbitrary classical network, there
exists a corresponding quantum multiple-unicast network code on the corresponding quantum network [10], [11].
We start this subsection by extending this known result to the case when shared randomness is employed.
1) The notations defined from the original classical network coding: In the following, we fixed the original
classical network code. As is done in the previous section, from the classical network code, we define integers
N , n, n′, l, q, {lk}
n′
k=1, sets V˜ , VS , VT , E, E˜, EI , EO, ER, EP , maps e, vI , vO, I, and the coefficients
{θj,k}j∈{n+l+1,··· ,|E|},k∈I(j), which identify the matrix M0 and its elements m0(j, k) by Eq.(4).
Other than the above notations, we have to define additional notation of a map E from the element in E to the
subset of VT such that
E(e′) :={vI(e(N + n+ l + j))|1 ≤ j ≤ n ∧ ∃k, (e
′ = e(k) ∧m0(k, j) 6= 0)}. (17)
Note that, when the content tranferred by the edge e′ depends on some messages, the set E(e′) indicates that of
all the terminal nodes where the messages are reconstructed.
2) Considering situation of the quantum network: From the items defined above, we list the conditions of the
considering situation as a quantum network:
• The number of nodes of the quantum network coding is N , and each member is labelled by an element of V˜
individually.
• The total Hilbert space, which all the nodes treat, is the direct product of the subspaces Hj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n or
n+l < j ≤ N+2n+l. Every subspaceHj is made from a q-dimensional Hilbert space, and has a computational
basis
{
|k〉j
}
k∈Fq
. Every subspace Hj of the first n subspaces is occupied by the node vO (e (j)) for each j.
Every subspace Hj of the other subspaces is occupied by the node vI (e (j)) for each j.
• Initially, there is no correlation, especially no entanglement, between any pair of nodes except for the preshared
quantum messages.
• At the time t = j, we can use a quantum channel identified by e (j) which transfers the quantum subspace Hj
from the node vI (e (j)) to the node vO (e (j)) where n+ l < j ≤ N + n+ l. Any channel can be used only
once, and any channel is an identity channel if the eavesdropper Eve does not attack the channel.
• A random number bj ∈ Fq, which is secret from Eve, is sheared by the nodes vO (e (k)) for n+
∑j−1
j′=1 lj′ <
k ≤ n +
∑j
j′=1 lj′ initially where 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′. Other than the random numbers, the vertex vO (e) shares a
secret random number in Fq with all vertices in E(e) for every e ∈ EP .
• Any node can apply any unitary operations and measurements for the occupied quantum subspaces depending
on any classical information which the node has at any time.
• Any authenticated but public classical communication is freely available from any node to all of the terminal
nodes. That is, each node can freely send classical information to any terminal node, and the information may
be revealed to Eve.
3) Purpose of the quantum network coding: There are two purposes for the multiple-unicast quantum network
code. The first purpose is to send an arbitrary quantum state on Cq from a source node vO (e (j)) to a terminal
node vI (e (N + n+ l + j)) for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} through the quantum network simultaneously. We call the
state a quantum message. Since any classical communication to terminal nodes is free, this task is equivalent to
constructing the maximally entangled state between a q-dimensional subspace in a source node vO (e (j)) and that
in a terminal node vI (e (N + n+ l + j)) for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Second purpose is to prevent the leakage of
any information about the quantum messages to Eve where she can access all the information transmitted via public
classical channel and quantum states as contents on the restricted quantum channels identified by EA.
In this paper, we will show some examples of quantum network codes which satisfies the following two properties.
First, quantum messages can be sent with fidelity 1, if there is no disturbance for any channels. Second, even if any
one or two edges are completely controlled by Eve, i.e. the transmitted contents are completely stolen and other
contents are injected on any one or two edges in E˜, it can be guaranteed that Eve can get no information about
the quantum messages.
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4) Preliminary definition of the quantum network coding: Before presenting the quantum network code, we give
the notations used in it. For a subset D of {1, · · · , N +2n+ l}, we define the subspace HD :=
⊗
j∈DHj . For an
Fq-valued vector ~y = (y1, · · · , yN+2n+l) ∈ FN+2n+lq , we abbreviate the state
⊗
j∈D |yj〉j as |~y〉D. Note that, from
this definition, a single vector has multiple expressions in order to simplify the expressions hereafter. To distinguish
a classical system from a quantum one easily, we introduce sets
QI (j) := {k ∈ I (j) |1 ≤ k ≤ n ∨ n+ l < k}
CI (j) := {k ∈ I (j) |n < k ≤ n+ l} ,
where I (j) is defined by Eq.(2). Using these notations, depending on the matrix θ = {θj,k}j,k, we define the
controlled unitary operation Uj(θ) acting on the Hilbert space Hj ⊗HQI(j) as
Uj(θ) = q
−N−2n−l+1+|QI(j)|
∑
~y∈FN+2n+lq
|yj +
∑
k∈QI(j)
θj,kyk〉j 〈yj|j ⊗ |~y〉QI(j) 〈~y|QI(j) .
On the space Hj , whose computational basis is {|y〉j}y∈Fq , we introduce the Fourier basis {|β˜〉j}β∈Fq as
|β˜〉j := q
−1/2
∑
y∈Fq
ωtr yβ |y〉j ,
where ω := exp
(
−2πip
)
. Here, tr z expresses the element Trψ(z) ∈ Fp, where ψ(z) denotes the matrix
representation of the multiplication map x 7→ zx which identifies the finite field Fq with the vector space Fdp, where
d is the degree of algebraic extension of Fq, i.e. pd = q. For the details, see [40, Section 8.1.2]. We also define the
generalized Pauli operators Xj(x) and Zj(β) as Xj(x) :=
∑
y∈Fq
|y + x〉j 〈y|j and Zj(β) :=
∑
y∈Fq
ωtr yβ |y〉j 〈y|j .
5) Quantum network code: Using the notations defined above, we show the multi-unicast quantum network code
which transfers the quantum messages from the space
⊗n
j=1Hj into the space
⊗n
j=1HN+n+l+j.
Protocol 1 The quantum network code deriving from a general classical linear network code
Step 1: Initialization
First, all the spaces Hj are initialized to the state |0〉j for n+ l < j ≤ N + 2n + l, at each edge.
Step 2: Transmission
This step consists of N+n substeps. The j-th substeps can be described as follows. At the time t = j′ := n+l+j,
the node vI (e (j
′)) operates the unitary
Xj′(
∑
k∈CI(j′)
θj′,n+kbk)Uj′ (θ) (18)
on Hj′ ⊗HQI(j′) where Hj′ is the controlled system and HQI(j′) is the controlling system. If j ≤ N , the node
vI (e (j
′)) sends the Hilbert space Hj′ to the node vO (e (j
′)) via the quantum channel e (j′).
Note that, if the node vI (e (j
′)) does not share any random number, i.e. CI (j′) = ∅, the generalized Pauli
operator Xj′(·) in the above relation is considered to be the identity operator.
Step 3: Measurement on Fourier-basis
This step consists of N + n substeps. The step identified by j ∈ {1, · · · , n, n+ l+ 1, · · ·N + n+ l} =: G′ can
be described as follows. The node vO (e (j)) measures the Hilbert space Hj in the Fourier basis, and sends the
measurement outcome βj to all the terminal nodes in E(e (j)). Here, if e (j) /∈ EP , the outcome is sent by public
channel, i.e. the outcome may eavesdropped by Eve, and, if e (j) ∈ EP , the outcome is sent by the one-time
pad, i.e. a secret randomness shared with the vertices in E(e (j)) is consumed and the outcome is completely
secret from Eve.
Step 4: Recovery
For all j satisfying 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the terminal node vI (e (N + n+ l + j)) operates
ZN+n+l+j
(∑
k∈G′ βkm0 (k, j)
)
, where a matrix M0 is defined by Eq.(4).
Note that, for all public communications sending an outcome βj to multiple nodes at a substep in Step 3, we
can combine a common single secret randomness for the one-time pad without losing secrecy. Furthermore, there
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is a special case such that E(e(j)) contains only the single node vO(e(j)). In that case, we send the outcome to
the node vO(e(j)) where the outcome is obtained. Therefore, the procedure is equivalent to doing nothing. As a
result, we don’t have to use any shared randomness even if e(j) ∈ EP for such a situation.
As you have seen, our protocol depends only on the set of coefficients {θj,k}j,k and the set of protected edges
EP . That is, our protocol is uniquely determined by the pair of {θj,k}j,k and EP , and we call it the quantum
network code {θjk}j∈{n+l+1,··· ,|E|},k∈I(j) with the set of protected edges EP .
B. Validity analysis
In order to analyze the quantum network coding, it is convenient to introduce ancillary set of q-dimensional
Hilbert spaces Hj−n occupied by the source node vO (e (j)) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Note that we never perform any
operations on the ancillary spaces.
As a generalization of [10, Theorem 1], we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the corresponding classical network coding identified by {θj,k}j,k is a multi-unicast
network code. By Protocol 1, any quantum message on the space Hj are simultaneously transferred to the
space HN+n+l+j with fidelity 1 for any j satisfying 1 ≤ j ≤ n if no one disturbs the protocol. That is, when
the maximally entangled state q−1/2
∑
x∈Fq
|x〉j−n |x〉j ∈ Hj−n ⊗Hj is prepared as the initial state on every
source node vO (e (j)) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, Protocol 1 makes the resultant state to be a maximally entangled state
q−1/2
∑
x∈Fq
|x〉j−n |x〉N+n+l+j on Hj−n⊗HN+n+l+j for any j satisfying 1 ≤ j ≤ n if all the quantum channels
are identity channels.
Remember that the transmission of quantum states is mathematically equivalent to sharing the maximally
entangled state between the input and output systems.
Proof: We define the Hilbert spaces HI and HO, as HI :=
⊗n
j=1Hj−n and HO :=
⊗n
j=1HN+n+l+j
respectively. Their bases {
⊗n
j=1 |aj〉j−n} and {
⊗n
j=1 |aj〉N+n+l+j} are abbreviated as {|~a〉I} and {|~a〉O}. The
sets G and G′ are defined to be {1, · · · , n, n+ l + 1, · · · , N + 2n+ l} and {1, · · · , n, n+ l+ 1, · · · , N + n+ l}.
By straightforward calculation, we find that the density matrix on the network after Step 2 is
1
qn+n′
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
⊗
∣∣∣M0 · (~a,~b)T〉
G
〈
M0 · (~a
′,~b)T
∣∣∣
G
=
1
qn+n′
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
⊗
∣∣∣M0 · (~a,~b)T〉
G′
〈
M0 · (~a
′,~b)T
∣∣∣
G′
⊗ |~a〉O
〈
~a′
∣∣
O
,
if all the quantum channels are identity channels. At the equality, we use the assumption that the classical protocol
is a multiple-unicast network code. The state after Step 3 can be expressed as
1
qn
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
ωtr
~βT
G′
·M0·(~a′−~a,~0n′)
T
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
⊗ |~a〉O
〈
~a′
∣∣
O
,
where ~βG′ := (β1, · · · , βn,~0l, βn+l+1, · · · , βN+n+l,~0n)
T . Finally, the state after Step 4 can be written as
1
qn
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
⊗ |~a〉O
〈
~a′
∣∣
O
,
which is the maximally entangled state to be constructed in this protocol.
C. Security analysis
Next, we discuss the security of the transmitted quantum state under the following four assumptions. First, the
eavesdropper Eve can eavesdrop and modify the contents transmitted via all the channels in EA, which is a subset
of E˜. Second, she also knows the network structure, i.e., the topology of the network and all the coefficients
{θj,k}j,k. Third, Eve can get any information transmitted by the public channel. Finally, Eve can’t obtain any other
information which may be correlated to the quantum messages.
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In order to treat Eve’s attack formally, we introduce the map ς and the constant h defined from e and EA as
is done in the case of Eve’s attack for the classical network coding. Using this notation, we formulate the Eve’s
attack as follow.
Eve’s attack: Eve initially occupies her initial Hilbert space W with a state |φini〉, where the dimension of the
space W is chosen to be sufficiently large so that every Eve’s operations can be treated as a unitary operation.
At the time t = ς (j), Eve applies the unitary Wj on Hς(j) ⊗W for 1 ≤ j ≤ h. Note that Wj does not depend
on the outcomes {βk}k since the measurement step is done just after the transmission step. However, Eve may
finally get the measurement outcomes βk where 1 ≤ k ≤ n or n + l < k ≤ N + n + l and ∀j, k 6= ι(j), i.e. the
measurement outcomes of the contents received from non-protected edge. In the following security analysis, these
classical information is denoted by a diagonalized density matrix on the space V , where the initial state of V is a
pure state.
From this assumption, we also formulate the security of the quantum network coding against Eve’s attack:
Definition 3. The quantum network code {θj,k}j∈{n+l+1,··· ,|E|},k∈I(j) with the set of protected edges EP is called
secure for Eve’s attack {Vj}j on the set of edges EA if the following condition holds. When the initial state on the
Hilbert space HI ⊗
⊗n
j=1Hj is the maximally entangled state between HI and
⊗n
j=1Hj i.e. the initial state is
that used in Theorem 1, the final state of the protocol on the subspace HI ⊗W⊗V is a product state with respect
to the partition between HI and W ⊗V .
It is easily understood that: this defined condition of the security is equivalent to the condition that there is no
leakage of the information about the quantum messages by the quantum network code. Note that, we call the state
ρ ∈ B (H′ ⊗H′′) a product state if there exist ρ′ ∈ B (H′) and ρ′′ ∈ B (H′′) such that ρ = ρ′ ⊗ ρ′′. Now, we can
present the main result of this paper:
Theorem 2. The quantum network code {θj,k}j∈{n+l+1,··· ,|E|},k∈I(j) with the set of protected edges EP is secure
for all Eve’s attacks on the set of edges EA if the following two conditions hold. (i) The classical network code
{θj,k}j∈{n+l+1,··· ,|E|},k∈I(j) is secure for Eve’s attacks on the set of edges EA. (ii) The messages are recoverable
for Eve’s attack on EA by the set of protected edges EP in the sense of the classical network coding.
From this theorem, we know that the security for the quantum messages is related not only to the secrecy of
the classical information but also to the recoverability of the classical information. Strictly speaking, this theorem
guarantees that the security analysis of our quantum network coding is reduced to the analysis of the secrecy and
the recoverability of the corresponding classical network coding.
D. Security proof
We can prove Theorem 2 by checking Definition 2 directly as follows:
Proof of Theorem 2:
We consider the case that we initialize the state on the Hilbert spaceHI⊗
⊗n
j=1Hj to be the maximally entangled
state between HI and
⊗n
j=1Hj , i.e.
⊗n
j=1 q
−1/2
∑
a∈Fq
|a〉j−n |a〉j , and execute Protocol 1.
Given Eve’s attack {Vj} on the set of edges EA, the total density matrix ρ on the space HI ⊗HO⊗V
′⊗W⊗V
becomes
q−2n−n
′−l
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~c,~c′∈Fhq
∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
⊗ 〈~˜β|G′ |M
′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉G〈M
′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |G|~˜β〉G′ ⊗
⊗
j∈G′
|βj〉
V ′
j 〈βj |
V ′
j
⊗ (
h∏
j=1
〈cj |ς(j) Vj |M(~a,
~b,~c)T 〉ς(j)) |φini〉 〈φini| (
h∏
j=1
〈
c′j
∣∣
ς(j)
Vj|M(~a
′,~b,~c′)T 〉ς(j))
†
⊗
⊗
j∈G′\H
|βj〉
V
j 〈βj |
V
j , (19)
after Step 3, where all the outcomes shared by terminal nodes are denoted by a diagonal density matrix on the space
V ′. Note that the bases of V and V ′ are expressed by {
⊗
j |βj〉
V
j } and {
⊗
j |βj〉
V ′
j } respectively, and we abbreviate
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the state |β˜j1〉j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |β˜jm〉jm as |~˜β〉(j1,··· ,jm) where
~β = (β1, β2, · · · ) as is the case of the computational base,
and H is defined to be the set {j|e(j) ∈ EP }. Since all the operators in Step 4 of Protocol 1 are operators closed
in the space HO ⊗ V
′, it is sufficient to check that the partial trace of ρ with respect HO ⊗ V
′, which is equal to
q−2n−n
′−l
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~c,~c′∈Fhq
∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
× Tr(〈~˜β|G′ |M
′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉G〈M
′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |G|~˜β〉G′)
⊗ (
h∏
j=1
〈cj |ς(j) Vj |M(~a,
~b,~c)T 〉ς(j)) |φini〉 〈φini| (
h∏
j=1
〈
c′j
∣∣
ς(j)
Vj|M(~a
′,~b,~c′)T 〉ς(j))
†
⊗
⊗
j∈G′\H
|βj〉
V
j 〈βj |
V
j , (20)
is a product state with respect to the partition between HI and W ⊗ V . To simplify this expression, we use the
following relation: for any density matrix ρG ∈ HG, any function g, and any sets D,D
′ which satisfies D,D′ ⊂ G,∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
g({βj}j∈D′∩D)Tr(〈~˜β|D′ρG|~˜β〉D′)
=
∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
q|G|−|D
′|g({βj}j∈D′∩D)〈~˜β|GρG|~˜β〉G
=
∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
q|G|−|D
′|g({βj}j∈D′∩D)〈~˜β|D ⊗ 〈~˜β|G\DρG|~˜β〉D ⊗ |~˜β〉G\D
=
∑
~β,~y∈FN+2n+lq
q|G|−|D
′|−N−2n−lg({βj}j∈D′∩D)〈~˜β|D ⊗ 〈~y|G\DρG|~˜β〉D ⊗ |~y〉G\D (21)
holds. First and the last equality just come from the fact that both {|β˜〉j}β and {|y〉j}y are bases of the space
Hj . The second equality comes from the property |~˜β〉D ⊗ |~˜β〉G\D = |~˜β〉G for any ~β ∈ F
N+2n+l
q which derived
from the definition directly. This relation can be used to modify the expression (20) by substituting G′, G\H ,
|M ′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉G〈M
′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |G, and
⊗
j∈G′\H}hj=1
|βj〉
V
j 〈βj |
V
j into D
′, D, ρG, and g({βj}j∈D′∩D) respectively.
As a result, the expression (20) can be rewrite as
q−N−3n−n
′−2l
∑
~a,~a′∈Fnq
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~c,~c′∈Fhq
∑
~β,~y∈FN+2n+lq
|~a〉I
〈
~a′
∣∣
I
× 〈~˜β|G\H |M
′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉G\H〈M
′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |G\H |~˜β〉G\H
× 〈~y|H |M
′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉H〈M
′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |H |~y〉H
⊗ (
h∏
j=1
〈cj |ς(j) Vj |M(~a,
~b,~c)T 〉ς(j)) |φini〉 〈φini| (
h∏
j=1
〈
c′j
∣∣
ς(j)
Vj|M(~a
′,~b,~c′)T 〉ς(j))
†
⊗
⊗
j∈G′\H
|βj〉
V
j 〈βj |
V
j . (22)
A part of this expression can be evaluated by using the recoverability as follows: For any ~a,~a′ ∈ Fnq , ~b ∈ F
n′
q , and
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~c,~c′ ∈ Fhq , the relation ∑
~y∈FN+2n+lq
〈~y|H |M
′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉H〈M
′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |H |~y〉H
=qN+2n+l−h
′
〈M ′(~a′,~b,~c′)T |H |M
′(~a,~b,~c)T 〉H
=qN+2n+l−h
′
〈~0N+2n+l|H |M
′(~a− ~a′,~0n′ ,~c− ~c
′)T 〉H
=qN+2n+l−h
′
δ(~0h′ ,M
′
ι(~a− ~a
′,~0n′ ,~c− ~c
′)T )
=qN+2n+l−h
′
δ(~a,~a′)δ(~0h′ ,M
′
ι(~0n+n′ ,~c− ~c
′)T ) (23)
holds where h′ is defined as |EP | as is done in the case of classical network coding. The first relation justified from
the fact that qN+2n+l−|D| is the number of vectors ~y ∈ FN+2n+lq which gives an identical state by |~y〉D for any D ⊂
G. The second relation comes from the fact that 〈~y′|D|~y〉D = 〈~0N+2n+l|D|~y− ~y
′〉D holds for any ~y, ~y
′ ∈ FN+2n+lq
and D ⊂ G. The third relation comes from the definition of H and the abbreviation of the computational basis,
where M ′ι is made from the M0, EA, and EP as is done in the case of the classical network coding in the previous
section. The last relation comes form the recoverability. That is, if M ′ι(~a−~a
′,~0n′ ,~c−~c
′)T = ~0h′ = M
′
ι
~0n+n′+h, the
relation ~a− ~a′ = f~0n′ (M
′
ι(~a− ~a
′,~0n′ ,~c − ~c
′)T ) = f~0n′ (M
′
ι
~0n+n′+h) = ~0n must be hold where f~0n′ is the function
defined in Definition 2. Therefore, the expression (22) becomes
q−N−3n−n
′−l
∑
~a∈Fnq
|~a〉I 〈~a|I
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~c,~c′∈Fhq
∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
× ωTr
~βT
G\HM
′(~0n+n′ ,~c
′−~c)δ(~0h′ ,M
′
ι(~0n+n′ ,~c− ~c
′)T )
⊗ (
h∏
j=1
〈cj |ς(j) Vj |M(~a,
~b,~c)T 〉ς(j)) |φini〉 〈φini| (
h∏
j=1
〈
c′j
∣∣
ς(j)
Vj |M(~a,~b,~c
′)T 〉ς(j))
†
⊗
⊗
j∈G′\H
|βj〉
V
j 〈βj |
V
j , (24)
where ~βG\H := (β
′
1, · · · β
′
N+2n+l) for β
′
j := βj if j ∈ G\H , and β
′
j = 0 if j /∈ G\H . Here, in addition to the
application of the relation (23), we have summed up with respect to ~a′, and we have evaluated the inner product
between the computational basis vectors and Fourier basis vectors. In the next modification, the secrecy for the
classical network coding is also used as follows: Since the corresponding classical network coding is secure, we
can define a function b which satisfies the relation (13). Note that Mς is uniquely defined from M0 and MA as is
defined in the case of the classical network coding. Using this function, we can find the relation∑
~b∈Fn′q
g(Mς(~a,~b,~c),Mς(~a,~b,~c
′))
=
∑
~b∈Fn′q
g(Mς(~a,~b(−~a) +~b,~c),Mς(~a,~b(−~a) +~b,~c
′))
=
∑
~b∈Fn′q
g(Mς(0,~b,~c),Mς(0,~b,~c
′)) (25)
for any function g. The first equality follows from the fact that the set Fq is a field, i.e. the set {x+ b|b ∈ Fq} is
equal to Fq for any x ∈ Fq. In the second equality, we just use the relation (13). This relation can be directly applied
for the expression (24), i.e. (
∏h
j=1 〈cj |ς(j) Vj |M(~a,
~b,~c)T 〉ς(j)) |φini〉 〈φini| (
∏h
j=1 〈 c
′
j |ς(j)Vj |M(~a,
~b,~c′)T 〉ς(j))
† is
substituted into g(Mς(~a,~b,~c),Mς(~a,~b,~c
′)). As a result, the expression (24), i.e. the expression (20), can be evaluated
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as
(q−n
∑
~a∈Fnq
|~a〉I 〈~a|I)
⊗ (q−N−2n−n
′−l
∑
~b∈Fn′q
∑
~c,~c′∈Fhq
∑
~β∈FN+2n+lq
ωTr
~βT
G\HM
′(~0n+n′ ,~c
′−~c)δ(~0h′ ,M
′
ι(~0n+n′ ,~c− ~c
′)T )
× (
h∏
j=1
〈cj|ς(j) Vj |M(
~0,~b,~c)T 〉ς(j)) |φini〉 〈φini| (
h∏
j=1
〈
c′j
∣∣
ς(j)
Vj|M(~0,~b,~c
′)T 〉ς(j))
†
⊗
⊗
j∈G′\H
|βj〉
V
j 〈βj |
V
j ). (26)
Here, we have use the fact that |M(~a,~b,~c)T 〉ς(j) for any 1 ≤ j ≤ h
′ can be thought as a function of Mς(~a,~b,~c)
T .
This final expression of the density matrix on HI ⊗W⊗V trivially shows that the density matrix is a product state
with respect to the partition HI and W ⊗V .

IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we present several examples of secure quantum network codes, and show their security.
A. Butterfly network
We apply Theorem 2 to the secure network coding of the butterfly network given in our previous paper [28].
The numbers of the edges are assigned as in Fig. 2. Almost all the parameters in this case are written down in the
following: q is a prime power and at the same time it is relatively prime to 2, N = 7, n = 2, n′ = 1, l = 2, l1 = 2,
V˜ ={v1, · · · , v6},
VS ={v1, v2},
VT ={v5, v6},
E ={e(1) = (i1, v1), · · · , e(13) = (v5, o2)},
E˜ ={e(5) = (v1, v3), · · · , e(11) = (v4, v6)},
EI ={e(1) = (i1, v1), e(2) = (i2, v2)},
EO ={e(12) = (v6, o1), e(13) = (v5, o2)},
EP ={e(11), e(12), e(13)},
ι(1) = 11, ι(2) = 12, ι(3) = 13,
I(5) = {1, 3}, I(6) = {2, 4}, I(7) = {1, 3},
I(8) = {2, 4}, I(9) = {5, 6}, I(10) = {9},
I(11) = {9}, I(12) = {8, 11}, I(13) = {7, 10},
θ5,1 = 2, θ5,3 = 2, θ6,2 = 2, θ6,4 = 1,
θ7,1 = 1, θ7,3 = 1, θ8,2 = 1, θ8,4 = 1,
θ9,5 = 1, θ9,6 = 1, θ10,9 = 1, θ11,9 = 1,
θ12,8 = −1, θ12,11 = 2
−1, θ13,7 = −1, θ13,10 = 2
−1,
M0 =

 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 00 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0

T ,
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{v5, v6} =E(e(9)) = E(e(10)) = E(e(11)),
{v5} =E(e(2)) = E(e(6)) = E(e(8)) = E(e(13)),
{v6} =E(e(1)) = E(e(5)) = E(e(7)) = E(e(12)),
φ =E(e(3)) = E(e(4)). (27)
The additional shared randomness expressed in Fig. 2 is just used for holding back the measurement outcome β11.
We assume that Eve attacks only one of edges {e(5), · · · , e(11)}. As an example, we suppose that e(6) is the
attacked edge, i.e. EA{e(6)} and ς(1) = 6. In this case, M , M
′, Mς and M
′
ι can be evaluated as
M =


1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2−1 − 1 2−1 − 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2−1 2−1


T
,
M ′ =


1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2−1 − 1 2−1 − 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 2−1 2−1


T
,
Mς =
(
0 2 1 0
)
,
M ′ι =

 2 0 1 11 −1 2−1 − 1 2−1
0 0 2−1 − 1 2−1

 .
(28)
By choosing the function ~b as
~b(~a) :=(2a2), (29)
we can check that the condition (13) holds, i.e. the corresponding classical network coding is secure against Eve’s
attack on the edge {e(6)}. And, by selecting the function f~b as
f~b(~y) :=(2
−1y1 − y3 − b1, 2
−1y1 − y2 − b1), (30)
we can also check the recoverability for Eve’s attack on {e(6)}, i.e. from the fact,
Yι(1) = Y11 =2A1 +B1 + C1
Yι(2) = Y12 =A1 −A2 + (2
−1 − 1)B1 + 2
−1C1
Yι(3) = Y13 =(2
−1 − 1)B1 + 2
−1C1,
we can check that
(A1, A2) =f(B1)(Y11, Y12, Y13)
=(2−1Y11 − Y13 −B1, 2
−1Y11 − Y12 −B1).
Therefore, Theorem 2 guarantees the security of the quantum state of Protocol 1 against the attack by Eve on
{e(6)}.
In fact, even in the case of Eve’s attacks on any other edge, we can easily show the secrecy in the classical
setting as discussed in [28], and easily check the recoverability. Hence, Theorem 2 guarantees the security of the
quantum state of Protocol 1 against Eve’s attack on any single edge in E˜. Indeed, in this case, Protocol 1 is equal
to the protocol given in [28]. Therefore, the application of Theorem 2 can be regarded as another proof of the
security analysis for the butterfly network given in our previous paper [28].
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Fig. 2. Butterfly network with our code
B. Example of networks with n-source nodes
The next example is depicted in Fig. 3. The graph (V˜ , E˜) is given as follows. The set of nodes V˜ is composed
of v1, . . . , vn+2, and the set of quantum channels E˜ is composed of e(2n + 1), · · · , e(4n + 1). The vertex vj is
connected to the vertices vn+1 and vn+2 via the edges e(2n + j) and e(3n + j) respectively where 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
And, the vertex vn+1 is connected to the vertex vn+2 via the edge e(4n + 1). The source nodes are given as
v1, . . . , vn, and there is single terminal node vn+2. Each source node vj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) intends to transmit a q-
dimensional quantum message to the terminal node vn+2, where q is a prime power and at the same time it is
relatively prime to n and n− 1. And, all the source nodes v1, . . . , vn share one random number b1 of the field Fq.
Therefore, the n input vertices i1, · · · , in are connected to source nodes v1, . . . , vn via input edges e(1), · · · , e(n),
respectively. One shared-randomness vertex r1 is connected to source nodes v1, . . . , vn via shared-randomness edges
e(n + 1), · · · , e(2n), respectively. The terminal node vn+2 is connected to n output vertices o1, · · · , on via the
output edges e(4n + 2), · · · , e(5n + 1), respectively.
The network code {θj,k}j∈{2n+1,··· ,5n+1},k∈I(j) is defined as follows:
θ2n+k,k = n, θ2n+k,n+k = 1,
θ3n+k,k = 1, θ3n+k,n+k = 1
θ4n+1,2n+k = n
−1,
θ4n+k+1,3n+k = 1− (n − 1)
−1, θ4n+k+1,3n+l = −(n− 1)
−1, θ4n+k+1,4n+1 = (n− 1)
−1,
(31)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 1 ≤ l ≤ n and k 6= l. The set of the protected edges EP consists of the n + 1 edges
e(3n + 1), · · · , e(4n + 1) connecting to the terminal node vn+2. Since all the protected edges connected to the
unique terminal node vn+2, it is not necessary to send the measurement outcomes of the states received from the
channel e(3n + 1), · · · , e(4n + 1). Therefore, we need not consume any additional secret randomness in order to
hold back the measurements outcomes.
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Fig. 3. The network of the first example, which consists of n input vertices, one shared-randomness vertex, n output vertices, and n+ 2
nodes
We can easily construct the (5n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix M0 made from {θj,k}, i.e.
m0(j, k) =


δ(j, k) if 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1
δ(n, k) if n < j ≤ 2n and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1
δ(j − 2n, k)n + δ(n + 1, k) if 2n < j ≤ 3n and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1
δ(j − 3n, k) + δ(n + 1, k) if 3n < j ≤ 4n and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1
1 if j = 4n+ 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1
δ(j − 4n− 1, k) if 4n+ 1 < j ≤ 5n + 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1,
(32)
and we can check that the condition (5) satisfies; that is, we can successfully send n messages parallelly by
the corresponding classical network code. From Theorem 1, that fact guarantees that the corresponding quantum
network code given in Protocol 1 transmits the desired quantum states correctly if there is no attack.
Now, we assume that Eve attacks only one of the edges e(2n + 1), · · · , e(4n + 1), i.e. EA = {e(j0)} for a
certain j0 which satisfies 2n+1 ≤ j0 ≤ 4n+1. From Theorem 2, we know that it is enough to check the secrecy
and recoverability of the corresponding classical network codes in order to guarantee the security of the transmitted
quantum states,
From the definition, the 1 × (n + 2) matrix Mς is equal to (m0(j0, 1), · · · ,m0(j0, n + 1), 0). Since the matrix
Mς have a single raw and the n + 1-th column of the matrix is non-zero, we can construct the function ~b which
satisfies the relation (5), i.e. the corresponding classical network code is secure against Eve’s attack on the edge
{e(j0)}.
The recoverability of the corresponding classical network code is shown as follows. When EA = {e(3n + k)}
with 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Mι (~a, 0, c1)
T = (a1, · · · , ak−1, c1, ak+1 · · · , an,
n∑
i=1
ai). (33)
When EA = {e(2n + k)} with 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Mι (~a, 0, c1)
T = (a1, · · · , an,
n∑
i=1
ai − ak + c1). (34)
When EA = {e(4n + 1)},
Mι (~a, 0, c1)
T = (a1, · · · , an, c1). (35)
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In every case, it is easy to check that there exists a function f0 satisfying (15). The existence is equivalent to
meeting the second condition in Lemma 3 which is given in Appendix A holds. Therefore, the classical network
code is recoverable for any Eve’s attacks on any single communication channel in E˜.
Therefore, Theorem 2 indicates that the quantum network coding given by Fig. 3 with (31) is secure for any
Eve’s attacks on any single quantum channel in E˜.
C. Network that is secure against all attacks on any two edges
The network of the next example is shown in Fig. 4. The corresponding graph (V˜ , E˜) is formally given as follows.
The set of nodes V˜ is composed of v1, . . . , v5, and the set of quantum channels E˜ is composed of e(7), · · · , e(14).
v1 is connected to v3, v4, and v5 via e(7), e(9), and e(11) respectively. v2 is also connected to v3, v4, and v5 via
e(8), e(10), and e(12). And, v5 is additionally connected from v3 and v4 via e(13) and e(14).
The source nodes are given as v1, v2 and the terminal node is given as v5. Source nodes v1 and v2 intend to
transmit a q-dimensional quantum message to terminal node v5, where we assume that q is relatively prime to 2,
3, and 5. In this network, all source nodes v1, v2 share two random numbers b1 b2 of the finite field Fq. As a
result, the two input vertices i1, i2 are connected to source nodes v1, v2 via input edges e(1), e(2), respectively. A
shared-randomness vertex r1 (r2) is connected to source nodes v1, v2 via the shared-randomness edges e(3), e(4)
(e(5), e(6)), respectively. The two output vertices o1, o2 are connected from terminal node v5 via output edges
e(15), e(16), respectively.
Then, the network code is defined by the following parameters:
θ7,1 = 1, θ7,3 = 1, θ7,5 = 0,
θ9,1 = 1, θ9,3 = 1, θ9,5 = 1,
θ11,1 = 1, θ11,3 = 0, θ11,5 = 1,
θ8,2 = 1, θ8,4 = 2, θ8,6 = 1,
θ10,2 = 2, θ10,4 = 1, θ10,6 = 2,
θ12,2 = 1, θ12,4 = 1, θ12,6 = 3,
θ13,7 = 1, θ13,8 = 1,
θ14,9 = 1, θ14,10 = 1,
θ15,11 = 3× 4
−1, θ15,12 = −2
−1, θ15,13 = 0, θ15,14 = 4
−1,
θ16,11 = −5× 8
−1, θ16,12 = −3× 4
−1, θ16,13 = −2
−1, θ16,14 = 9× 8
−1,
(36)
The set of the protected edges EP consists of the four edges e(11), e(12), e(13), e(14) connecting to terminal node
Fig. 4. The network of the first example, which consists of n input vertices, one shared-randomness vertices, n output vertices, and n+ 2
nodes
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v5. Since this network has the single terminal node v5, it is not necessary to send all the measurement outcomes
from edges e(11), e(12), e(13), e(14). Thus, we need not consume any additional secret randomness to hold back
the measurement outcomes.
By straightforward calculations, we can check that the network code satisfies condition (5); therefore, we
can successfully send 2 characters parallelly with the corresponding classical network code. That is, Theorem
1 guarantees that the corresponding quantum network code given in Protocol 1 transmits the desired quantum
messages correctly if there is no attack on all the edges.
Now, we assume that Eve attacks any two of edges in the set E˜; EA = {e(j0), e(k0)} for 7 ≤ j0 < k0 ≤ 14.
From Theorem 2, we can guarantee the security of the transmitted quantum message by checking the secrecy and
recoverability of the corresponding classical network codes.
This network coding satisfies n′ = h = 2. We can directly calculate Mς,2 and verify that Mς,2 is an invertible
matrix for any choice of EA = {e(j0), e(k0)} with 7 ≤ j0 < k0 ≤ 14. For example, in the case of j0 = 8, and
k0 = 13, we can evaluate Mς,2 as
(
2 1
1 0
)
. Thus, Corollary 1 guarantees the secrecy of this classical network
code against Eve’s attack.
We next focus on the recoverability of the corresponding classical network code. From the second condition in
Lemma 3 proved in the Appendix A, we only need to consider the case where all random variables are fixed to
0. In this case the information on the edges on e(11), e(12), e(13), and e(14) can be written as A1, A2, A1 +A2,
and A1 + 2A2, respectively, where A1 and A2 are the information sent from I1 and I2, respectively if there are
no disturbances. Hence, we can recover A1 and A2 from any two of the edges. Now, from the topology of the
graph, Eve’s attack on EA = {e(j0), e(k0)} affects at most two of these edges. Therefore, the protected edges EP
including the above edges are recoverable.
Finally, from Theorem 2, the quantum network coding given by Fig. 4 with Eq.(36) is secure for all Eve’s attack
on the any two of quantum channels in E˜.
D. Quantum threshold ramp secret sharing
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) [41] is a protocol to encrypt a quantum state into a multipartite state so that each
system (share) has no information and an original state can be reproduced from a collection of the systems. Various
different QSS schemes have been developed [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46]. Among them, a (k, L, n)-threshold
ramp QSS scheme is defined as a QSS scheme with n shares having the following property [43]: The original state
can be reconstructed from any k shares, and any k−L shares has no information. Hence, partial information of the
original state can be drived from t shares with k > t > k−L. The network codes given in the above subsections B
and C are strongly related to (k, L, n)-threshold ramp QSS scheme with k = n. Here, the condition k = n means
that all the n shares are required to reconstruct the original state.
The network code given in the subsection B is related to a (2n, 2n− 1, 2n)-threshold ramp QSS scheme. Let us
consider a new network in Fig. 5 which can be derived from the network in Fig. 3 by the following modification
of the graph. n− 1 vertices from v2 to vn are also merged into the vertex v1, i,e, a set of vertices {vi}1≤i≤n are
replaced by a single vertex v1. The vertex vn+1 is also merged into the vertex vn+2. As a result, the edge e(4n+1)
disappears. All the edges connected to an old replaced vertex are connected to the corresponding new vertex, and
all the edges connected from an old replaced vertex are connected from the corresponding new vertex. Following
this modification, the network code is also modified as follows:
θ2n+k,k = n, θ2n+k,n+k = 1,
θ3n+k,k = 1, θ3n+k,n+k = 1
θ4n+k+1,3n+k = 1− (n− 1)
−1, θ4n+k+1,3n+l = −(n− 1)
−1, θ4n+k+1,2n+l = n
−1(n− 1)−1,
(37)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 1 ≤ l ≤ n and k 6= l. Note that, the indexing of the vertices vj and edges e(j) breaks the
general description rule defined in the previous section in order to make it easy to compare this example and that
in the subsection B. From the security analysis of the subsection B, this network code, which does not have any
intermediate nodes, is apparently secure against Eve’s attack on any one of the 2n channels. On the other hand,
all the information on 2n channels are required to recover the original quantum state. Further, since the classical
randomness is used only in v1, the classical randomness can be generated on the node v1. Hence, as a protocol
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Fig. 5. The network that can be derived from the second example by contracting the edge e(4n+1) and merging vertices vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
in graph theoretical sense
Fig. 6. The network that can be derived from the third example by contracting the edge e(4n+1) and merging vertices vi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
in graph theoretical sense
sending n-quantum messages from the input node v1 to the output node vn+2, this network coding is nothing but
(2n, 2n − 1, 2n) quantum threshold ramp secret sharing scheme [43].
The network code given in the subsection C is also related to a (6, 4, 6) quantum ramp secret sharing scheme. Let
us consider a new network in Fig. 6 which can be derived from the network in Fig. 4 by the following modification
of the graph operations. The vertex v2 is merged into the vertex v1. The vertices v3 and v4 are also merged into the
vertex v5. As a result, the edges e(13) and e(14) disappears. All the edges connected to an old replaced vertex are
connected to the corresponding new vertex, and all the edges connected from an old replaced vertex are connected
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from the corresponding new vertex. Following this modification, the network code is also modified as follows:
θ7,1 = 1, θ7,3 = 1, θ7,5 = 0,
θ9,1 = 1, θ9,3 = 1, θ9,5 = 1,
θ11,1 = 1, θ11,3 = 0, θ11,5 = 1,
θ8,2 = 1, θ8,4 = 2, θ8,6 = 1,
θ10,2 = 2, θ10,4 = 1, θ10,6 = 2,
θ12,2 = 1, θ12,4 = 1, θ12,6 = 3,
θ15,9 = 4
−1 θ15,10 = 4
−1, θ15,11 = 3× 4
−1, θ15,12 = −2
−1,
θ16,7 = −2
−1, θ16,8 = −2
−1, θ16,9 = 9× 8
−1, θ16,10 = 9× 8
−1,
θ16,11 = −5× 8
−1, θ16,12 = −3× 4
−1,
(38)
From the security analysis of the subsection C, this new network code, which does not have any intermediate nodes,
is apparently secure against Eve’s attack on any two of the 6 channels. On the other hand, all the information on
6 channels are required to recover the original quantum state. Further, since the classical randomness is used only
in v1, the classical randomness can be generated on the node v1. Hence, as a protocol sending a quantum message
from the input node v1 to the output node v5, this network coding is nothing but (6, 4, 6) quantum threshold ramp
secret sharing scheme [43].
V. ADVANTAGES OF OUR QUANTUM NETWORK CODE AGAINST QUANTUM ERROR CORRECTING CODE ON
PARTIALLY CORRUPTED QUANTUM NETWORK
In this paper, we give a way to make protocols of secure transfer of quantum messages on quantum networks
designed originated from classical network coding. However, it has been already investigated to construct such a
protocol designed originated from quantum error correcting code, i.e. quantum error correcting code on partially
corrupted quantum network [30], [31], [32]. Therefore, we think that it is fair to compare the secure quantum
network coding given in this paper and the quantum error correcting code on partially corrupted quantum network.
As a special property of quantum information, it is well known that, if quantum messages can be transferred with
fidelity 1, it is guaranteed that any other party can’t get any information about the quantum messages. Therefore, it
is natural to apply this property to construct protocols of secure transfer of quantum messages on quantum network
which is made from the following three processes. 1) By using a quantum error correcting code, a quantum message
is encoded into several quantum characters at the source nodes. 2) The quantum characters are sent to terminal
nodes via a quantum network. 3) At the terminal nodes, the transmitted quantum characters are decoded into the
original quantum message. If the amount of disturbances by Eve is bounded by a threshold given by the error
correcting code, the secrecy and reliability of the transfer of the message are simultaneously guaranteed. Such an
idea has been discussed by several papers [30], [31], [32]. However, our construction of the quantum network
coding has two advantages against these previous works.
First advantage is a wide applicability. Even in the previous papers [30], [31], [32], operations in the intermediate
nodes are designed originated from classical network coding automatically. However, all the operations on the
intermediate node are restricted to be unitary operations. For example, all the node operations are quantum unitary
gates designed originated from arbitrary bijective linear maps [31]. As a result, only the bijective functions can
be used to design the quantum operators. Strictly speaking, only the invertible functions can be used. From this
restriction, we can’t construct a quantum network protocol by simple application of quantum error correcting code
even on the butterfly network for example. Therefore, very restricted types of quantum network protocols can be
constructed from the previous papers especially in the sense of the variety on the intermediate nodes. In the case
of quantum network coding in this paper, the operations in the intermediate nodes are CPTP map generally, i.e.
unitary operations and measurement operations. As a result, we can design the node operations originated even from
irreversible linear maps. Note that such a property is inherited from the previous result regarding the construction
of quantum network coding designed originated from classical network coding without secrecy [10] which is a
basis of our result.
Second advantage is an improvement of the secrecy. As we mentioned, in the quantum network protocol made
from quantum error correcting code, the secrecy and reliability is indistinguishable. As a result, the secrecy of
the code is deeply connected to theoretical limits of quantum error correction. However, in the quantum network
coding proposed here, even if the terminal node can’t recover the original quantum message, it is possible that the
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two conditions in Theorem 2 hold with respect to the set EP of the protected edges. In this case, the secrecy of the
quantum message is guaranteed1. Therefore, the secrecy is not necessarily restricted by theoretical limits of error
correcting code.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on a secure classical network code, we have proposed a canonical way to make a secure quantum network
code in the multiple-unicast setting. This protocol certainly transmits quantum states when there is no attack. While
our protocol needs classical communications, they are limited to one-way communications i.e., all of the classical
information is given by predefined measurements on nodes and only the final operators on the terminal nodes are
affected by the information. Hence, it does not require verification process, which ensures single-shot security.
We have also shown the secrecy of the quantum network code under the secrecy and the recoverability of the
corresponding classical network code. Our security proof focuses on the classical recoevrbility and the classical
secrecy [47].
Our protocol offers secrecy different from that of QKD. While our protocol has the restriction of the number
of attacked edges, our protocol does not require repetitive quantum communications because it does not need
a verification process. In contrast, QKD needs repeatative quantum communications, which enables us to verify
the non-existence of the eavesdropper and to ensure the security. Finally, although the previous result [28] can
be applied only to a special secure code on the butterfly network, our secure network code can be applied to
any secure classical network code. We have demonstrated several application of our code construction in various
network including the butterfly network. These applications show applicability of our method.
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APPENDIX A
LEMMAS FOR CLASSICAL NETWORK CODE
We give a corollary and a lemma for classical network coding that are used for the analysis on our examples
given in the section IV.
A. Corollary for secrecy
We can obtain the following corollary of Lemma 2, which is useful for actual analysis.
Corollary 1. When h = n′, a (classical) network code is secure for all of Eve’s attacks on EA, if Mς,2 is invertible.
In particular, when h = n′ = 1, the (classical) network code is secure for all Eve’s attack on EA, if Mς,2 6= 0.
Proof: When Mς,2 is invertible, Mς,2 is surjective. Thus, the image of Mς,1 is contained in that of Mς,2.
When h = n′ = 1, Mς,2 is just an element of a finite field. Hence, it is invertible if and only if it is non-zero.
B. Lemma for recoverability
We can relax the recoverability condition from Definition 2 as follows:
Lemma 3. The following three conditions are equivalent:
1) The messages are recoverable for Eve’s attack on EA by EP .
2) There exists a function f~0n′ : F
|EP |
q → Fnq satisfying
f~0n′
(
M ′ι ·
(
~a,~0n′~c
)T)
= ~a (39)
1The reference [29] showed that this condition is equivalent to the recoverability of the original quantum message by collecting the
information from all the protected edges.
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for all ~a ∈ Fnq and ~c ∈ F
h
q .
3) There exist an n-by-|EP | matrix M1 and an n-by-n
′ matrix M2 such that the relation
M1 ·M
′
ι ·
(
~a,~b,~c
)T
= ~a+M2 ·~b (40)
holds for any vectors ~a ∈ Fnq , ~b ∈ F
n′
q , and ~c ∈ F
h
q .
The last condition in this lemma means that if there exists a decoder, it can be always chosen as a linear decoder.
Proof: Since the directions 3)⇒1)⇒2) is trivial, we show only 2)⇒3).
Assume 2). We easily find that f~0n′ can be restricted to be linear since the condition (39) demands the function
f~0n′ to be linear on the region expressed by the form M
′
ι · (~a,~0n′~c)
T for any vectors ~a ∈ Fnq , and ~c ∈ F
h
q . Hence,
f~0n′ on the image of M
′
ι can be written as an n-by-|EP | matrix M1. Since the map ~b 7→M1 ·M
′
ι ·
(
~0n,~b,~0h
)T
is
linear, there exists an n-by-n′ matrix M2 such that M2~b = M1 ·M
′
ι ·
(
~0n,~b,~0h
)T
. Thus,
M1 ·M
′
ι ·
(
~a,~b,~c
)T
=M1 ·M
′
ι ·
(
~a,~0n′ ,~c
)T
+M1 ·M
′
ι ·
(
~0n,~b,~0h
)T
=~a+M2~b,
which implies 3).
APPENDIX B
CONSTRUCTIONS OF MATRICES DESCRIBING NETWORK
In this appendix, we concretely construct the matrices describing the network structure.
A. Construction of M0
The definition of input edges and shared-randomness edges determine the coefficients {m0 (j, k)}j,k for 1 ≤ j ≤
n + l as follows: For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, e (j) is an input edge, that is, e (j) ∈ EI . Thus, the definition of input edges
determines {m0 (j, k)}
n+n′
k=1 as
{m0 (j, k)}
n+n′
k=1 = (
~0j−1, 1,~0n+n′−j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (41)
For n+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n + l, e (j) is a shared-randomness edge, that is, e (j) ∈ ER. Hence, there uniquely exists an
integer j′ ∈ [1, n′] such that n+
∑j′−1
k′=1 lk′ < j ≤ n+
∑j′
k′=1 lk′ . Thus, the definition of shared-randomness edges
determines {m0 (j, k)}
n+n′
k=1 as
{m0 (j, k)}
n+n′
k=1 = (
~0n+i′−1, 1,~0n′−i′) for n < j ≤ n+ l. (42)
By substituting the expression (4) of Yj into the relation (3), we derive the recurrence relation of m0 (j, k) as
m0 (j, k) =
∑
k′<j
θj,k′m0
(
k′, k
)
for n+ l < j ≤ N + 2n+ l. (43)
Note that M0 is a matrix which identifies the relation between the character transferred on the edges and the
combination of messages and shared-secure-random number in the case that there is no disturbance for every
channel. Therefore, we can use Eq.(3) and (4).
The Eqs. (41),(42), and (43) enable us to evaluate all the coefficients of the (N +2n+ l)× (n+n′) matrix M0,
i.e. {m0 (j, k)}j,k, recursively.
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B. Construction of M
In the case of 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ l, Yj is not affected by disturbances by definition. Therefore,
m (j, k) =
{
m0 (j, k) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ l and 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ n
′
0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ l and n+ n′ < k ≤ n+ n′ + h
(44)
M is a matrix which identifies the relation between the character transferred on the edges and the combination of
messages, shared-secure-random number and injected character. That means, we consider the case that there may
exist disturbances. Therefore, we have to use the relation
Yj =
∑
k<j
θj,kY
′
k for n+ l < j ≤ N + 2n + l
instead of the the relation Eq.(3). By substituting the expressions (6) and (8) of Yj and Y
′
j into the above relation,
we obtain the relation
m (j, k) =
∑
k′<j
θj,k′m
′(k′, k) for n+ l < j ≤ N + 2n+ l. (45)
By combining (9) for the above relation, we derive the following recurrence relations for m (j, k):
m (j, k) =
∑
k′<j
θj,k′m
(
k′, k
)
+
h∑
k′=1
θj,ς(k′)(δk,n+n′+k′ −m
(
ς
(
k′
)
, k
)
)Θ(j − ς
(
k′
)
− 1), (46)
for n+ l < j ≤ N + 2n+ l, where Θ(y) is a step function such that Θ(y) = 0 (Θ(y) = 1) if y < 0 (y ≥ 1).
The Eqs. (44) and (46) enable us to evaluate all the coefficients of the (N + 2n+ l)× (n+ n′ + h) matrix M
recursively.
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